of criminal responsibility than they view other kinds of evidence? Legal scholars have long debated the implications of genetics for legal decision making (Hoffmann & Rothenberg, 2007; Johnson, 1998; Jones, 2003) . The current debate mostly relates to whether genetic predispositions objectively affect volition and free will, and whether this impact should affect how the judicial system punishes offenders. One issue that this debate misses is how people actually perceive genetic evidence.
Impact of Genetic Attributions on Cognitions
People frequently perceive genetic information in biased ways. Nelkin and Lindee (1995) contended that our cultural environment is saturated with simplistic and fatalistic messages about genes, imbuing genes with undue inferential power. further proposed that people engage in a specific set of biased and fatalistic cognitions called genetic essentialist biases, when they encounter genetic explanations of behavior. For instance, encountering genetic attributions leads people to view the associated phenotype as necessarily following from the genotype. Although there are monogenic phenomena that follow this deterministic relationship (e.g., autosomal dominant genetic disorders such as Huntington's disease), it is inappropriate to generalize from these cases as the vast majority of genetic effects are far more complex, involving the interaction of numerous genes, whose expression is governed by environmental experiences and other epigenetic influences (e.g., Jablonka & Lamb, 2006) . In these far more numerous cases, assuming immutability in the genotype-phenotype relation would be inaccurate. As an example of the biased effects of genetic attributions, people who learn about genetic influences of mental illnesses come to associate the illnesses with less controllability and more persistence, while simultaneously leading to more sympathetic views of the afflicted (Lebowitz, Ahn, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2013; Phelan, 2005; Walker & Read, 2002) .
Implications for Legal Decision Making
A critical feature of genetic essentialist biases is their link to a perceived lack of control (e.g., Dar-Nimrod, Heine, Cheung, & Schaller, 2011) . This has important implications for legal decision making due to the preponderance of free will and volition assumed by the criminal justice system (Coffey, 1993) . Given that the presumption of self-control is paramount for judging responsibility, genetic attributions of criminal behavior should accordingly lead to weaker perceptions of criminal responsibility and also to more lenient punishments. Despite much discussion within legal circles regarding whether such perceptions should occur as a result of genetic explanations (Berryessa & Cho, 2013; Johnson, 1998; Rose, 2000) , few studies have examined whether they do occur. Anecdotal evidence from court cases around the world demonstrates the impact of genetic evidence on judges and jurors. For example, partly on account of evidence based on Caspi et al.'s (2002) behavioral genetics work, two independent Italian courts reduced the sentences of two different defendants charged with murder-a reduction of 1 year in one case and a reduction from life imprisonment to 20 years in another case (Forzano et al., 2010; Owens, 2011) . Beyond anecdotal evidence, studies find that reducing beliefs in free will and increasing perception of a neural basis of human behavior both lead to reduced retributive punishment (Shariff et al., 2014) . More germane to our research, state trial judges issued shorter sentences to a hypothetical perpetrator with a biomechanical explanation for their psychopathy, perceiving the biomechanical cause as a mitigating factor (although the researchers did not examine whether other kinds of explanations would be viewed as equally mitigating; Aspinwall, Brown, & Tabery, 2012) . Moreover, these judges also found biomechanical explanations to be aggravating, suggesting a higher likelihood of reoffending (i.e., higher recidivism). How the general public negotiates these countervailing expectations has not been well-understood.
Other studies found that biological explanations decreased perceptions of culpability for hypothetical criminals relative to experiential explanations Monterosso et al., 2005) . These studies contribute to the growing debate about whether biological explanations of crime may influence people's judgments in ways that other explanations do not (see Appelbaum & Scurich, 2014; , and such differences may have important implications for legal decision making.
Overview of Studies
Our three studies strive to identify the degree to which genetic explanations affect various aspects of legal decision making relative to other kinds of explanations. This article examines a broader set of legal decisions compared with past research that are either explicitly expressed (e.g., preferred verdict) or internally held (e.g., attributions of the perpetrator), and seeks to identify mediators that underlie these effects. Importantly, as Aspinwall et al.'s (2012) results suggest, genetic attributions may possess a double-edged nature. Thus, we hypothesize that genetic explanations for criminals, relative to environmental explanations, will lead to both mitigating perceptions such as more lenient perceptions of culpability, and aggravating perceptions such as greater expected recidivism. These studies include various novel measures rarely used in past research on essentialist biases in decision making, such as preferred verdicts, mitigating defenses, and expected recidivism. We are particularly interested in comparisons between genetic and environmental explanations as this allows us to determine whether genetic explanations differ from other types of explanations. Our three studies culminated in an aggregate dataset with an appropriate sample size to conduct a path analysis (Preacher & Coffman, 2006) , directly examining the impact of the potential simultaneously double-edged nature of genetic attributions on punitiveness.
Study 1

Method
Participants. In our initial study, we anticipated that we would have medium effect sizes. With a target power level of 0.80, an α-level of .05, and a total of three groups and one covariate (described below), we required approximately 130 participants (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) . We subsequently recruited 132 American participants (40% males; M age = 35.48, SD = 12.71) from Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk). The sample consisted of 76% Euro-Americans, 9% East Asians, 11% "Others," 4% unspecified (due to the small number of participants who were not of European descent, we could not test for interactions involving culture). Furthermore, because political orientation is associated with legal decision making (see Cochran, Boots, & Chamlin, 2006) , participants also indicated this using a 5-point scale (1 = very liberal, 5 = very conservative; M = 2.59, SD = 0.97). Participants received US$0.25 for participating in the study.
Materials. The study consisted of the following materials, in order:
Experimental manipulation. The manipulation consisted of one of three randomly assigned vignettes about a college student, Patrick, who fatally stabbed another person after an altercation. The three vignettes differed only in terms of the explanation given for his behavior: the Genetic vignette described Patrick's (fictitious) genetic predisposition for responding to provocations with violence; the Environmental vignette described Patrick's rearing environment that predisposed him to violence; and the Control vignette offered no explanation. Importantly, the magnitude of the purported effect of each explanation was identical; both causes were described as leading to a fourfold increase in the likelihood of violence.
Perceptions of culpability. To measure the extent to which people perceived Patrick's culpability for his crime, we asked the following questions.
Defense claims. Participants rated the applicability of three defense claims (Insanity, Diminished Capacity, Intoxication) for Patrick on a 7-point scale (0 = not at all applicable, 6 = perfectly applicable). Each defense claim was accompanied by corresponding definitions based on legal texts (American Law Institute, 1962; Brody, Acker, & Logan, 2001; Padfield, 2008) . Insanity and Diminished Capacity were included as they constitute a full and partial defense, respectively (Baum, 2013) , allowing us to examine people's perception of the applicability of different degrees of defense claims. Intoxication was included to ensure that participants would not simply deem any defense claim to be more or less applicable (intoxication was unrelated to information from the vignette). We expected that the Insanity and Diminished Capacity defenses would be deemed more applicable in the Genetic condition than the other conditions, but not for the Intoxication defense.
Verdicts. Participants made the same judgment regarding four verdicts (First degree murder, Second degree murder, Manslaughter, Not guilty) as they did with the defense claims discussed above, using the same 7-point scale. Each verdict was presented with an accompanying definition based on those that appear in the U.S. Code (18 U.S.C. § 1111-1112).
Sentencing. Participants read that Patrick had been convicted of manslaughter, and they were to assign an appropriate prison sentence using an 11-point scale (1 = 5 years, 11 = >50 years). Based on previous studies (e.g., Aspinwall et al., 2012; , we expected that participants in the Genetic condition would assign a shorter prison sentence compared with participants in the other conditions.
Perpetrator-relevant perceptions. Finally, participants indicated how criminally responsible they felt that Patrick was on an 11-point scale (0 = not at all criminally responsible, 10 = completely criminally responsible). Participants also used a 7-point scale to rate the degree to which Patrick (a) had conscious control over his actions (0 = not at all, 6 = complete control), (b) intended to kill the victim (0 = not at all, 6 = full intention), (c) had knowledge that his actions would lead to the victim's death (0 = not at all, 6 = full knowledge), and (d) would reoffend if he were released back into the public (0 = not at all likely, 6 = completely likely). Past research (e.g., Aspinwall et al., 2012) suggests that participants should perceive less criminal responsibility, less conscious control, less intention to kill, and greater recidivism in the Genetic condition compared with the other conditions. In contrast, the perpetrator's knowledge that his actions would kill the victim was not expected to differ across conditions as the kind of explanation should be irrelevant to knowledge. Moreover, based on previous findings, particularly regarding the perceived double-edged nature of biological explanations of human behavior (e.g., , we also predicted that perceptions of conscious control and recidivism on the part of the perpetrator should mediate differences between groups in terms of prescribed prison sentences.
Results
We performed one-way ANCOVAs using Conditions (Genetic, Environmental, Control) as the independent variable with political orientation as the covariate (conservativism may be associated with overall heightened punitiveness). Adjusted means were compared using least significant difference (LSD) multiple comparisons. All adjusted means and effect sizes from all pairwise comparisons can be found in the online supplemental materials (OSMs). The latter two were not significantly different, p = .494. We suspect that because the Control condition offered no explanations, participants assumed intoxication was involved.
Verdicts. There was no effect of Condition on perceived appropriateness of any verdicts, Fs < 2.50, ps > .100, η p 2 s < 0.04.
Sentencing. There were no effect of Condition, F(2, 123) = 0.25, p = .780, η p 2 s = 0.00, 95% CI = [0.00, 0.04].
Perpetrator-relevant perceptions. There was a significant effect of Condition on perceived control, F(2, 123) = 3.14, p = .047, η There were no effects of Condition on perceived criminal responsibility, intent to kill, and knowledge that actions would have killed, Fs < 2.00, ps > .300, η p 2 s < 0.02.
Mediation analysis.
1 Despite sentencing not being affected by Condition, such results may mask informative mechanisms for theory building and confirmation (see Rucker, Preacher, Tormala, & Petty, 2011; Zhao, Lynch, & Chen, 2010) , especially when there are a priori expectations of underlying mechanisms. Furthermore, the traditional Baron and Kenny (1986) requirement for a significant direct effect for mediation leads to an underpowered approach for testing mediation (Edwards & Lambert, 2007; MacKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz, 2007) ; therefore, we focused on the indirect effects in determining mediation. We performed a mediation analysis in accordance with , testing for an indirect effect of different conditions on sentencing through perceived control. Figure 2A shows a marginal tendency for participants in the Environmental condition to perceive Patrick as having more conscious control over his behavior than participants in the Genetic condition, β = .40, t (123 .56], but was nominally larger than the non-mediated direct effect, potentially suggesting a suppression effect (see Figure 2C ). We investigate this further in subsequent studies.
Discussion
Study 1 found evidence that exposure to genetic explanations of criminal behavior affected various aspects of legal decision making-Such explanations led to higher perceived applicability of both the Insanity and Diminished Capacity defenses (but not the Intoxication defense), compared with environmental explanations. This is the first demonstration of genetic ascriptions' effect on people's endorsement of various mitigating accounts for a crime. This suggests that people view genes to be responsible for one's actions by liberating them from their own responsibility. Moreover, participants in the Genetic condition tended to differ from those in the Control condition, which tended to be similar to those in the Environmental condition.
Genetic explanations also led people to ascribe less control to the perpetrator than people's default and environmental explanations, mirroring previous research . As predicted, perceptions of the perpetrator's knowledge of the consequences of his actions did not differ, as the genetic explanation affected neither the perpetrator's intelligence nor knowledge. Unexpectedly, analyses did not reveal a significant effect of condition on perceived intentions. It may be that all participants perceived the perpetrator as having the same degree of intention to kill, but the genetic predisposition rendered the perpetrator less able to control his impulses. We explore this latter possibility in Study 3.
Counter to our expectations, explanations of criminal behavior did not affect perceived criminal responsibility, verdicts, and sentencing, despite affecting perceived control. We had expected that such perceptions would lead to more lenient sentences and preferences for less serious verdicts. Subsequent mediation analyses revealed that, as expected, there are marginal indirect effects of behavioral explanations on sentencing through perceived conscious control and perceived recidivism, but in opposite directions. Specifically, genetic ascriptions lead to nominally lower perceptions of perceived conscious control of one's behavior, predicting shorter prison sentences. While genetic ascriptions did not lead to significantly higher perceived recidivism, it predicted lengthier prison sentences, resulting in a marginal indirect effect. These two mediators work in opposition to each other and provide empirical evidence for the double-edged perceptions given by justices in Aspinwall et al.'s (2012) study. We further investigate this in subsequent studies.
Study 2
We conducted Study 2 to try to replicate, and test the robustness of, Study 1's results, and to explore additional effects of genetic explanations. In particular, we explored the relevance of attribution theory (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Weiner et al., 1971) to how genetic explanations affect legal decision making.
Attribution theory assumes four dimensions relevant to how people understand the causes of behavior: causal locus, causal stability, causal control, and causal specificity (Abramson et al., 1978; Anderson, Krull, & Weiner, 1996; Weiner, 1985) . Causal locus refers to whether the behavioral cause is internal or external to the person. Causal stability is whether the behavioral cause would always exert its influence on the outcome behavior. Causal control refers to whether one has control over the cause of the behavior. Finally, causal specificity is whether the behavioral cause only affects a specific domain rather than being domain-general. Given theoretical expectations about people's tendencies to essentialize genes (Nelkin & Lindee, 1995) , genetic causes should be perceived as more internal, stable, specific, and less controllable, than environmental causes.
Researchers have previously applied attribution theory to legal decision making. For example, more internal attributions of a crime led participants to view the criminal behavior as being more stable across time, which was associated with greater expected recidivism (Carroll & Payne, 1977) , leading to lengthier prison sentences (Tam, Shu, Ng, & Tong, 2013) . Note that this is the opposite direction of what past research has found with perceived biological causes of criminality (e.g., Aspinwall et al., 2012) , despite genetic causes being seen as more internal than environmental causes (DarNimrod & Heine, 2011) . This suggests that attribution theory may be key for understanding the double-edged nature of genetic ascriptions.
Method
Participants. We increased our sample size, subsequently recruiting 165 undergraduate students from the University of British Columbia (23% males; M age = 21.48, SD = 4.89). The sample consisted of 38% Euro-Canadians, 33% East Asians, and 28% "Others," although no culture-condition interactions were significant, leading us to collapse across ethnic groups. Participants' political orientation was assessed using the same measure as Study 1 (M = 2.47, SD = 0.98). Participants received course credit for their participation. As in Study 1, we conducted one-way ANCOVAs with political orientation as the covariate.
Materials. The study used the same measures as in Study 1, 2 with the addition of the Attributional Style Questionnaire (Peterson et al., 1982) that was adapted for our specific vignettes. Furthermore, the original questionnaire only included questions for causal locus, stability, and specificity (for ease of interpretation, the causal specificity question was reverse-coded so that higher scores refer to greater causal specificity). We thus added a question regarding the causal control to reflect the four dimensions of Weiner's attribution theory ("In the future, whenever Patrick is provoked in a fashion similar to what occurred in the scenario, will Patrick be able to control how much the cause of his behavior will influence him?"). We also asked participants about their belief in the general malleability of the causal factor to which they were assigned (causal malleability) ("Is the effect of the cause of Patrick's behavior something that can be changed or corrected [i.e., such that the cause of Patrick's behavior will no longer affect Patrick's behavior]?"). All questions were on a 1 to 7 scale, with higher scores indicating greater internal, stable, specific, controllable, and malleable attributions, separately. In addition, based on work suggesting that internal causes are associated with lengthier prison sentences (e.g., Tam et al., 2013) , causal locus should mediate group differences in the length of prescribed prison sentences.
Results
Defense claims. There was a main effect of Condition on the applicability of the insanity defense, F(2, 160) = 8.11, p < .001, Verdicts. There was no effect of Condition, Fs < 1.20, ps > .300, η p 2 s < 0.01
Sentencing. There were no effect of Condition, F(2, 160) = 0.44, p = .657, η p 2 s = 0.00, 95% CI = [0.00, 0.04].
Perpetrator-relevant perceptions. There was a significant effect of Condition on perceived control, F(2, 160) = 6.95, p = .001, η Figure 2B ).
Discussion
Replicating Study 1, participants perceived both the Insanity and the Diminished Capacity defenses to be more applicable after reading a genetic explanation for Patrick's behavior compared with an environmental explanation-this was not the case with the Intoxication defense. Again, this did not translated into different verdicts, suggesting that there are additional factors beyond simply explaining violent behavior as etiologically genetic or environmental.
Also like Study 1, judgments and perceptions in the Genetic, but not the Environmental, condition tended to deviate from the Control condition. In contrast, both experimental conditions tended to deviate from the Control condition with causal attributions, suggesting that explicitly referencing any cause affects one's causal attributions. Notably, causal attributions for all groups tended to cluster at the scales' extremes, suggesting general agreement in the attributional profile of different causes. Despite this, genetic explanations still seem to have a statistically different profile than environmental ones-one that is more internal and specific, and less malleable, resembling the profile found by Dar-Nimrod, Cheung, Ruby, and Heine (2014) regarding obesity perceptions.
Differences in the perceived applicability of criminal defenses again did not lead to differences in sentencing and perceived criminal responsibility; however, the mediation analyses in the present study uncovered two mechanisms that explain the lack of significant differences in sentencing across conditions. Study 2 revealed a significant indirect effect of participants' condition on the length of prescribed prison sentences through perceived conscious control and internal attributions. That is, genetic explanations led to less perceived conscious control, resulting in shorter sentences. Conversely, genetic explanations also led to stronger internal attributions, resulting in lengthier sentences, similar to previous research (e.g., Carroll & Payne, 1977; Sanderson, Zanna, & Darley, 2000; Tam et al., 2013) . This tension between shorter sentences due to less perceived conscious control and lengthier sentences due to stronger internal attributions may explain why there is no direct effect of behavioral explanation on sentence length. Moreover, the mediated direct effect through internal attribution is larger than the non-mediated direct effect, potentially showing a positive cooperative suppression effect (Conger, 1974; Krus & Wilkinson, 1986 ), which we attempt to replicate in Study 3. Overall, seeing a genetic cause behind violent behaviors led participants to view the behaviors as less controllable and the cause as more internal. In conjunction with the mediation in Study 1 regarding perceived recidivism, genetic attributions appear to be seen as double-edged swords that can be simultaneously mitigating and aggravating.
Study 3
The findings from Studies 1 and 2 are consistent-genetic accounts, compared with environmental explanations, lead people to consider different defenses and other aspects of the legal decision-making process differently; however, it is not clear whether genetic ascriptions affect people's judgments because they expect perpetrators to have stronger impulses toward violence or have less control of their impulses. Study 3 sought to clarify this issue and to replicate findings from Studies 1 and 2.
Method
Participants. Because this study has an extra condition (described below), and that some of our previous effects had rather wide CIs, we boosted this study's sample size to 303 American participants from MTurk, with an effective sample size of 298 participants who passed our comprehension check questions (42% males; M age = 34.62, SD = 11.26). The sample consisted of 68% Euro-Americans, 7% African Americans, 3% Asian Americans, 22% "Others." Participants' political orientation was assessed using the same measure as before (M = 2.63, SD = 1.05). We again conducted one-way ANCOVAs with political orientation as the covariate.
Materials. The study used the same Genetic and Environmental scenarios as in Studies 1 and 2, with the addition of two other scenarios (creating four conditions). In the GeneImpulse scenario, participants learned that Patrick's gene had created a stronger impulse to act violently compared with people without that gene. In the Gene-Control scenario, participants learned that Patrick's gene had decreased his ability to control his violent impulses relative to people without that gene. Participants answered the same questions regarding the perceived appropriateness of criminal defenses, appropriate sentence length, and perceptions of conscious control, criminal intent, and criminal responsibility on the part of Patrick. We changed our sentence length measure from a scale with 5-year increments to one with 1-year increments. This brought our measure more in line with other work that have demonstrated significant differences involving genetic manipulations (e.g., Aspinwall et al., 2012; . Participants also received the same attribution style questions used in Study 2. We also reinserted the corrected question about perceived recidivism from Study 1 (see Footnote 2), but the remainder of the questions were left out of Study 3 as the two previous studies demonstrated strongly that we should not expect differences between the Genetic and Environmental conditions for them. Given Study 3's research question, the Control condition from previous studies was not relevant and was dropped. Figure 2B ).
Results
Reflecting our findings from Study 1, the GeneticEnvironmental contrast on perceived recidivism was not significant β = −.24, t(287) = −1.57, p = .117, 95% CI = [−0.54, 0.05], but perceived recidivism, again, predicted lengthier sentences, β = .37, t(286) = 6.73, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.24, 0.48]. The indirect effect was in the predicted direction, β = −.09, 95% CI = [−0.21, 0.02]. The mediated direct effect, β = .44, t(286) = 3.08, p = .002, 95% CI = [0.16, 0.73], became larger than the non-mediated direct effect, β = .35, as reported above, also replicating the suppression effect found in Study 1 (see Figure 2C ).
Discussion
Results from Study 3 replicated all significant effects of Condition between the Genetic and Environmental conditions in Studies 1 and 2. Most importantly, we demonstrated a reliable mediation between Genetic versus Environmental explanations and prescribed sentence length through perceived conscious control, internal attributions, and marginally significantly through perceived recidivism. The latter two analyses also showed a replicable suppression effect across our studies (see Paulhus, Robins, Trzesniewski, & Tracy, 2004) . One main difference between this study and the two previous studies is that a change in methodology regarding how participants recommended a sentence yielded a significant difference between the Genetic and Environmental conditions in prescribed prison sentence length, more in line with past research (e.g., Aspinwall et al., 2012; . This suggests the importance of methodological concerns when examining sentencing practices.
Moreover, the fact that our Gene-Impulse and GeneControl conditions did not generally yield significant differences from the Genetic condition suggests several possibilities. When people encounter genetic behavioral explanations, they do not consider what mechanisms link genotypes to phenotypes, instead defaulting to a simplistic "cause-and-effect" schematic of genetic effects on behavior. Another possibility is that people consider one or both of these mechanisms by default, rendering the three genetic conditions mostly equivalent. It is of note, though, that when significant contrasts emerge between these conditions, it was always between the Genetic and the Gene-Impulse conditions, suggesting a greater likelihood that people pair genetic explanations with a lack of control rather than experiencing a greater impulse.
Additional Analyses From Aggregate Dataset
To better estimate the effect sizes of the difference between the Genetic and Environmental conditions in terms of all of our criterion variables, we aggregated participants' data in these two conditions into one aggregate dataset across the three studies. This resulted in a sample size of 350 participants for our one-way ANCOVAs, with political orientation as the covariate (see Table 1 for all effect sizes from the aggregate dataset). Figure 2A) . Another mediation analysis found that the Genetic condition leads to stronger internal causal attributions than the Environmental condition, β = −.63, t (255) Figure 2B ).
Finally, a mediation analysis revealed that the perceived recidivism is also important in explaining how the Genetic condition may affect prison sentences differently than the Environmental condition. Specifically, there was a marginal trend for the Genetic condition to elicit greater perceived recidivism than the Environmental condition, β = −.22, t(230) = −1.74, p = .083, 95% CI = [−0.48, 0.02] . This, in turn, predicted lengthier sentences overall, β = .40, t(229) = 6.37, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.28, 0.51]. The indirect effect of recidivism was in the predicted direction, β = −.09, 95% CI = [−0.20, 0.01] . Similar to the mediation analyses involving internal attributions, this mediation analysis demonstrates another reliable suppression effect, with the mediated direct effect, β = .34, t(229) = 2.74, p = .006, 95% CI = [0.11, 0.57], being stronger than the non-mediated direct effect, β = .21 (see Figure 2C ).
Path analysis.
We conducted a path analysis using the "lavaan" package in R (Rosseel, 2012) to determine the effect of all three mediators in simultaneously explaining variation in prison sentence length between participants in the Genetic and Environmental conditions. Furthermore, because Aspinwall et al.'s (2012) study revealed that both the mitigating factor of lower perceived conscious control and the aggravating factor of higher perceived recidivism appear to be phenomenologically related, we also predicted a pathway leading from the mitigating factor to the aggravating factor. This model is shown in Figure 3 . The correlation matrix for all predictors (including covariates) can be found in Table 2 . Our model demonstrates that internal attributions, perceived conscious control, and perceived recidivism, all mediate the path from the contrast between the Genetic and Environmental conditions and prison sentence length, χ 2 (2) = 7.62, p = .022, comparative fit index (CFI) = 0.97, root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) = 0.09, standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) = 0.03.
General Discussion
We examined whether genetic explanations of criminal behavior affect legal decision making differently than environmental explanations of criminal behavior, resulting in findings that carry important implications.
One particularly important implication of these studies pertains to mens rea, a legal concept pertaining to one's malicious intent and volition to commit a crime, and is necessary for a conviction (American Law Institute, 1962) . Perceiving someone's actions as being beyond their control likely leads to the perception that the perpetrator lacked mens rea. Indeed, many defense claims, some of which we adopted for our study, are meant to mitigate mens rea by arguing for lack of intention and/or control. In line with previous work (DarNimrod & Heine, 2011) , our studies support the idea that genetic explanations more robustly affect mens rea-related attributions differently than other kinds of explanations. It is important to keep in mind that the means for participants' acceptance of defenses were generally below the midpoints of the scales, suggesting that participants did not perceive them to be highly applicable; however, the pattern of differences across conditions informs our hypotheses. As such, across all three studies, genetic explanations reliably increased the perceived applicability of both the Insanity and Diminished Capacity defenses compared with environmental explanations involving one's upbringing. Related to these findings, compared with environmental explanations, genetic explanations overall lowered one's perceptions of the perpetrator's control over his actions as well as his perceived intention to harm the victim; but they do not affect perceptions of whether the perpetrator knew the potential outcome of his actions. Altogether, these results suggest that genetic explanations diminish one's agency-despite knowing that his actions could have killed the victim, he neither was able to control his behavior nor did he really intend to kill the victim. Both of these beliefs may partially mitigate a person's perceived guilt. Unfortunately, our research cannot determine whether people understand genetic causes as affecting one's impulses or one's ability to inhibit their impulses. Additional research is needed.
Despite the impact of genetic explanations on general perceptions of mens rea, they do not appear to explicitly affect perceptions of criminal responsibility or ultimate verdicts compared with environmental explanations. Across the three studies, only Study 3 revealed lower levels of criminal responsibility in response to a genetic explanation compared with either an environmental explanation or people's default perception.
Furthermore, participants' perceptions of final verdicts were not affected across the three studies, suggesting that genetic explanations may not affect ultimate legal judgments. While this may, prima facie, appear to be the case, the prescribed sentence length provides important insight into potentially latent mechanisms. Specifically, our studies revealed three mechanisms. First, genetic, versus environmental, explanations led to lower perceptions of conscious behavioral control, which predicted lighter prison sentences. However, genetic explanations triggered more internal causal attributions and expectations of reoffending than environmental explanations, subsequently predicting lengthier prison sentences, potentially mapping onto distinctions between retributive versus rehabilitative punishment due to one's implicit theories of behavior (Plaks, Levy, & Dweck, 2009) . Genetic evidence may, thus, force people to concurrently consider and reconcile this opposing combination of mitigating and aggravating points, which may not necessarily neutralize each other (having done so in Studies 1 and 2, but not in Study 3). These findings are reminiscent of studies examining the effect of neuroimaging evidence (Schweitzer et al., 2011) , potentially stemming from genetic evidence being seen as being a double-edged sword . Overall, our path analysis supports these ideas, revealing that all three mediators simultaneously affect people's deliberation over sentencing as a result of being exposed to genetic versus environmental explanations.
Also important is the finding that genetic explanations led to different types of causal attributions than environmental explanations. Overall, genetic causes are seen as being more internal, more stable, more domain-specific, and less malleable than environmental causes, but not more controllable. This different pattern of attributions may help future researchers develop new hypotheses for how genetic and environmental explanations may affect legal decision making.
The replication of most of our findings across three studies suggest that genetic explanations cause people to think differently than environmental explanations do, particularly in legal contexts, by reliably affecting certain aspects of the legal decision-making process, such as the applicability of .19*** .14** .27*** 1.00
Note. The Condition contrast has the Genetic condition coded as 0, and the Environmental condition coded as 1.
defense claims, certain mens rea-relevant perceptions, and sentencing. Furthermore, the penchant for genetic explanations, more than environmental explanations, to differ from responses in the control condition suggests that in many cases, genetic explanations are the engines that drive the shifts in people's thinking away from their default ways of making sense of criminal responsibility. Future work should compare genetic explanations to a wider range of alternative behavioral explanations, such as neurological explanations of criminal behavior (Gazzaniga, 2011) , to determine the extent to which genes hold special explanatory power. Given that work by Appelbaum, Scurich, and Raad (2015) suggests that biological explanations may be equally essentialized, our results potentially highlight key differences that are more applicable to delineations of "nature"-type versus "nurture"-type explanations.
Limitations
Our three studies required participants to make legal decisions based on limited facts presented in a brief vignette. It remains uncertain whether such effects are generalizable to trial settings during which jurors encounter days' worth of testimony and information. Furthermore, as jury decisions are usually made in groups, they may also be subject to the influence of group processes such as polarization (Isenberg, 1986) and groupthink (Janis, 1972) , neither of which we examined here.
There may also be external validity concerns as our online and college samples are not representative of their respective populations; however, given that some results mimic those from a large representative sample , our results should be generalizable. In addition, as this research was all conducted with North Americans, it is unclear whether the results would generalize to other cultures. Some research indicates that East Asians are less likely to attend to dispositions (Choi, Nisbett, & Norenzayan, 1999) and to have weaker entity theories of self (Heine et al., 2001) than North Americans, suggesting that East Asians might be affected by genetic attributions less, although we could not test for the effect of ethnicity in our studies.
Furthermore, the use of single items as dependent variables may lead to unstable results, suggesting issues with reliability (see Wanous & Reichers, 1996) ; however, many single items are used to replace lengthier scales while retaining good psychometric properties (e.g., Rammstedt & Rammsayer, 2002; Robins, Hendin, & Trzesniewski, 2001 ). This, in conjunction with the fact that our results replicate across studies (both significant and non-significant), leads us to believe that our measures captured meaningful variance attributable to our conditions.
